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1. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a company's internal affairs are governed
by its state of incorporation without regard to where it actually
conducts its affairs.1 In addition, a company is free to select the
state in which it incorporates. A company's free choice of
jurisdictional incorporation, combined with the rule that the
jurisdiction in which a company incorporates governs the
company's internal affairs, underpins the regulatory competition
2
and de facto national convergence that exists in the United States
through Delaware General Corporation Law.3 This general type of
corporate law doctrine is known as "state of incorporation"
theory.4
In the European Community ("EC"), however, neither
regulatory competition nor convergence has traditionally existed,
since a corporation's state of incorporation did not necessarily
govern its internal affairs in other jurisdictions.5 Although certain
EC Member States such as the United Kingdom and Denmark
1 See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (stating that because in the United
States a corporation's internal affairs is governed by its state of incorporation
without regard to its principal place of business, a U.S. corporation can choose the
state corporate law that governs its affairs by choosing its state of incorporation).
2 For a discussion of regulatory competition in the United States and its
positive or negative implications, see infra section 4.1.
3 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 350 (noting that the aggregated choices of a
majority of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence on
the Delaware General Corporation Law as a de facto national corporate law).
4 Id.
5 See id. (stating that historically, convergence through regulatory
competition was not available in Europe because the corporate law of the country
in which the corporation's principal place of business was located governed its
internal affairs regardless of the country of incorporation).
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applied state of incorporation corporate law theory, most Member
States such as France and Germany did not.6 Instead, they applied
a doctrine that dictated that the law of a company's real seat
governed a company's internal affairs.7 A company's real seat
included either the jurisdiction where it had its principal place of
business or its headquarters.8 This general type of corporate law
doctrine is known as the "real seat doctrine." 9
Until recently, the real seat doctrine has prevented
jurisdictional competition in corporate law in the EC by restricting
forum shopping.' 0 Hanne Birkmose, a noted European Union
("EU") scholar, suggests that this situation may have changed as a
consequence of the judgment in the Centros case.'1 Two additional
cases12 after Centros, Uberseering, and Inspire Art, also impact this
6 See P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 Duke L.J. 1, 51
(1985) (noting that most countries in continental Europe use the real seat rule).
7 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 350 (explaining that convergence through
regulatory competition was not available in Europe because the widespread
application of the "real seat" doctrine dictated that the corporate law of the
country in which the corporation's principal place of business was located
governed its internal affairs regardless of the country of incorporation, a
mandatory coincidence of a company's primary business location and the
corporate law covering its governance).
8 For a brief summary of the real seat doctrine, see STEFANO LOMBARDO,
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN COMPANY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
PREREQUISITES AND LIMITS 25-27 (2002) (noting that the real seat theory applies to a
company the law of the country where the management has its stable seat or
where the company has its major place of business independent of the law of the
country where the company has its registered office).
9 Gilson, supra note 1, at 350.
10 See Hanne Sondergaard Birkmose, The Fear of the Delaware-effect - The
American Demon?, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPANIES AND COMPANY
LAWS 244 (Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig Sorensen eds., 2001) ("As a result of the
widespread application of the siege reel theory in the EU, forum shopping has
been severely restricted.").
11 Id. See also Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen,
1999 E.C.R. 1-1459 (holding that it is contrary to Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty for
a Member State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance
with the law of another Member State in which it has its registered office but in
which it conducts no business where the branch is created for the purpose of
evading application of more restrictive rules as regards the paying up of a
minimum capital).
12 See Case C-208/00, Cberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919 (holding that where a company formed in
accordance with the law of a Member State ("A") in which it has its registered
office exercises its freedom of establishment in another Member State ("B"),
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC require Member State B to recognize the legal capacity
and, consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings which the
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situation as they apply Articles 4313 and 4814 of the EC Treaty on
the freedom of establishment to further limit the application of a
host Member State's national law regarding companies that
already have nationality, or legal personality, 15 in another Member
State. A case before Centros, Daily Mail16, also relates to this
situation as Uberseering and Inspire Art have affirmed that Daily
Mail still limits the application of the freedom of establishment in
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.
This Article ultimately attempts to answer what effects Daily
Mail, Centros, Ulberseering, and Inspire Art, in total, will have on
jurisdictional competition in corporate law in the EC. Section 2
analyzes the evolving jurisprudence of these four cases. Its
extensive analysis includes a discussion of the implications of these
cases for jurisdictional competition and for the Member States with
strict laws that have sought to block the importation of relaxed
rules into their jurisdictions. It concludes, inter alia, that these
decisions of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") have altered the
company enjoys under the law of its state of incorporation ("A")); see also Case C-
167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd.
2003 E.C.R. 1-10155 (holding that it is contrary to Articles 43 EC and 48 EC for
national legislation to impose on the exercise of freedom of secondary
establishment in that State by a company formed in accordance with the law of
another Member State certain conditions provided for in domestic company law
in respect of company formation relating to minimum capital and directors'
liability).
13 Article 43 reads in relevant part:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory
of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also
apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or
subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory
of any Member State.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 43, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 195 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
14 Article 48 reads in relevant part: "Companies or firms formed in
accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office,
central administration or principal place of business within the Community
shall ... be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of
Member States." EC Treaty, art. 48.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
16 See Case C-81/87, The Queen v. HM Treasury and Comm'rs of Inland
Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483 (holding that
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty confer no right on a company incorporated
under the legislation of a Member State and having its registered office there to
transfer its central management and control to another Member State).
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real seat doctrine enough that, at a minimum, a partial
jurisdictional competition regarding certain issues will be possible
in the case of new incorporations. Section 3 then examines
whether these cases will allow a full jurisdictional competition so
as to lead to a race for laxity. It concludes that the reincorporation
barriers are probably too high in the EC, given that Daily Mail still
stands, and that the Tenth and Fourteenth Directives on Company
Law have not yet been passed. Section 4 hypothetically accepts the
possibility of a race in light of these four cases, but questions
whether EC Member States will have the incentive to actually
compete for incorporations, and if they do, whether a likely
jurisdictional competition for only new incorporations would be
efficient. Section 5 summarizes the relevance of the Societas
Europaea ("SE") statute, which creates the possibility of having
European corporations, with regard to the above jurisdictional
competition analysis. It explores potential loopholes in the
structure of the SE Statute that would possibly make jurisdictional
competition even more likely, despite the fact that SE Statute
generally threatens to foreclose it. Finally, Section 6 presents this
Article's conclusions.
2. A DISCUSSION OF FOUR EC COMPANY LAW CASES: DAILY MAIL,
CENTROS, UBERSEERING, AND INSPIRE ART
2.1. Daily Mail
Daily Mail and General Trust plc was an investment bank
incorporated as a public limited company17 in the United Kingdom
("U.K.") that applied for consent under U.K. Section 482(1) (a)18 to
transfer its central management and control to Holland.19 Its
purpose in transferring its central management and control to
Holland was to circumvent English tax law. Without waiting for
consent, as required by Section 482(1)(a), Daily Mail opened an
investment management office in Holland.
17 See Al Company Services Limited, Public Limited Company (PLC) Formation
http://www.alcompanies.com/plc/ (last visited April 13, 2006) (explaining what
a limited company is in the United Kingdom).
18 Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, § 482(1), Eng.
19 See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. 1-5483, para. 5 ("Section 482(1)(a) of the Income
and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 prohibits companies resident for tax purposes in
the United Kingdom from ceasing to be so resident without the consent of the
Treasury.").
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The United Kingdom objected to the circumvention of its
national tax law. It argued that Daily Mail should sell at least part
of its assets in order to reckon with British tax authorities before
transferring its central management and control out of the United
Kingdom.20 Daily Mail, however, had other plans. It asserted that
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty gave it the right to transfer its
central management and control to another Member State either
without consent at all, or with the right to obtain mandatory
consent.21 The ECJ then phrased the issue of this case as follows:
whether Articles 43 and 48 "preclude a Member State from
prohibiting a body corporate with its central management and
control in that Member State from transferring without prior
consent that central management and control to another Member
State ... *"22
In deciding this issue, the E.C.J. first concluded that the
provisions of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, which protect a
company's right of establishment, applied to the Member State of
origin, or home Member State, despite the fact that Articles 43 and
48 were primarily directed to ensuring that foreign nationals and
companies were treated in the host Member State in the same way
as nationals of that state.23 At the same time, the Court opined that
the establishment rights under Articles 43 and 48 would be
rendered "meaningless" if a home Member State could flat out
prohibit corporations established under its laws from leaving in
order to establish themselves in host Member States.
24
After deciding this issue, the Court noted that the freedom of
establishment in Article 43 conferred the right upon companies
20 Specifically, the court noted that transferring its residence for tax purposes
would have enabled Daily Mail to:
sell a significant part of its non-permanent assets and to use the proceeds
of that sale to buy its own shares, without having to pay the tax to which
such transactions would make it liable under United Kingdom law, in
regard in particular to the substantial capital gains on the assets which
the applicant proposed to sell.
Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. 1-5483, paras. 7-8. Although Daily Mail would have
subsequently been subject to Dutch tax law, the aforementioned series of
transactions would have been taxed only with regard to the capital gains that
accrued after the transfer of its residence for tax purposes. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. para. 9.
23 Id. para. 16.
24 Id.
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established in a home Member State to set up "agencies, branches
or subsidiaries" in host Member States. 25  Daily Mail's
management office fell within the definition of agencies, branches
or subsidiaries.26 However, the Court ultimately held that the U.K.
tax law did not impinge on Daily Mail's freedom of establishment
because the United Kingdom merely limited Daily Mail from
transferring its central management and control out of the United
Kingdom while maintaining "its legal personality and its status as
a United Kingdom company."27
2.1.1. A critical analysis and exploration of Daily Mail
Daily Mail's holding suggested that if Daily Mail's operation in
the Netherlands was a branch and if Articles 43 and 48 granted a
right of establishment to a company incorporated in home Member
State A to set up a branch in a host Member State B, then it would
seem that home Member State A could not have imposed any
restrictions on Daily Mail's movement without violating its
establishment right.
In Daily Mail, however, the Court interestingly took the view
that the freedom of establishment provisions never applied, since
home Member State A law (U.K. law) did not actually prevent
companies from setting up branches 28 as companies could wind-
up.29 This would allow a company to divest itself of legal
personality under the home Member State's law. Thus, in sum,
although the Daily Mail court's holding narrowly applied to home
Member States, it potentially broadly implied that the confluence
of two events would technically mean that a Member State's
restriction of a company's movement would not be a specific
limitation of that company's freedom of establishment right. These
two events were: 1) residence transfer or transferring management
25 Id. para. 17.
26 See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R., 1-5483, para. 17 ("[Tlhat is the form of
establishment in which the applicant engaged in this case . .
27 Id.
28 See supra text accompanying note 13; see also Werner F. Ebke, Centros - Some
Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 629 (2000) (noting that the right
to set up branches, agencies, and subsidiaries is covered by the concept of
secondary establishment).
29 See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. 1-5483, para. 18 (suggesting that in the case of
winding-up, a partial or total transfer of the activities of a company incorporated
in the U.K. to a company newly incorporated in another Member State is not
necessary).
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and control; and 2) maintaining legal personality status in a
Member State.
30
After Daily Mail, it appeared that a Member State's law could
effectively interfere with the very purpose of Articles 43 and 48, the
right of a company incorporated in one Member State to set up a
branch in another Member State, without violating these
provisions.31  This suggested that the right of secondary
establishment which refers to the right to set up agencies, branches
or subsidiaries, although recognized doctrinally as a full right,
would yield to at least two conditions.
The first condition, residence transfer, was the very
circumstance that would have allowed Daily Mail to evade U.K.
tax law. As the Court noted, "only companies which are resident
for tax purposes in the United Kingdom are as a rule liable to
United Kingdom corporation tax." 32  The cynic might have
concluded that the Court was looking for a way to stop the
circumvention of U.K. law. This is especially so considering that
the opinion of the Advocate General to the Court stated: "As a
general rule it appears that the national court may assess whether,
in a specific case and having regard to the circumstances, there is a
suggestion of abuse of a right or circumvention of the law and
whether it should decide not to apply Community law."
33
Although the Court did not conclude that a state can refuse to
apply EC law where there was intent to circumvent national law, it
is clear that such reasoning may have been at the back of its mind.
The second condition, legal personality, was an attempt to
reconcile freedom of establishment with the traditional notion that
"unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in
the present state of Community law, creatures of national law."
34
This condition, combined with the residence transfer condition,
30 See id. ("It requires Treasury consent only where such a company seeks to
transfer its central management and control out of the United Kingdom while
maintaining its legal personality and its status as a United Kingdom company.");
see also Ebke, supra note 28, at 636 (noting that Member States generally give
automatic recognition to companies that are formed under other Member States'
national laws).
31 See Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. 1-5483, para. 17 (suggesting a conflict between a
company's primary establishment right to choose which legal regime applies and
a Member State's right to control companies that come within its national law).
32 Id. para. 4.
33 Id. para. 9 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
34 Id. para. 19.
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suggested that even host Member States who applied the real seat
doctrine could perhaps restrict company immigration when a
company's real seat residence was transferred, since the transfer
might have created legal personality in the real seat state.35
These implications were merely speculative because Daily Mail
never stated a principle against circumvention. One might even
see its failure to explicitly assert such a principle, which was stated
in the Advocate General's opinion, as evidence that the Court
never intended to wholly prevent circumvention of national law.
2.2. Centros
Centros Ltd. was a private limited company36 incorporated in
the U.K. 37 since its inception, Centros never traded in the U.K., but
instead sought to establish a place of business in Denmark.
Centros was owned by two Danish nationals domiciled in
Denmark, whose intent was to use U.K. incorporation to
circumvent Danish minimum capital requirements. 38
Danish law article 117(1),39 in accord with Articles 43 and 48 of
the EC Treaty, provided that foreign companies had a right to set
up a branch.40 Denmark, however, tried to refuse registration to
Centros on the grounds that it had not established a branch.
Denmark asserted that Centros's establishment in Denmark was a
35 This also would have tacitly held back circumvention of national laws. For
example, if company C, a new company, incorporated in home Member State A,
decided to transfer its principal operations to host Member State B (a real seat
doctrine state) in order to avoid B's stricter company law requirements, B, even
though circumvention was not stated as contrary to Community law, could
presumably have been able to not recognize A. For the resolution of this issue, see
infra Section 2.3.
36 See Al Company Services Limited, supra note 17 (defining a limited
company in the United Kingdom as a company whose liability is limited by
English law or Scots law).
37 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, para. 2 (explaining that a Ltd. is a private limited company in the
U.K.); see also LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 39 (noting that harmonization of capital
requirements had not been achieved for the private limited company form).
38 See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, para. 2 (explaining the background of
Centros ownership).
39 Anpartsselskabslov art. 117(1).
40 See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, para. 5 ("Private limited companies and
foreign companies having a similar legal form which are established in one
Member State of the European Communities may do business in Denmark
through a branch.") (internal quotations omitted).
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"principal establishment" 41 as it was established merely to
circumvent the national law on minimum capital requirements and
as it had never traded in the United Kingdom.
42
Centros contended that the establishment satisfied the
conditions for a "branch" and that the right of establishment in
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty allowed it, as a duly formed
U.K. company, to set up a branch in Denmark.43 It also asserted
that the fact that it had not traded in the U.K. did not affect its
freedom of establishment. 44
The Court first dismissed the relevance of Denmark's principal
establishment argument,45 thereby broadly construing "agencies,
branches, or subsidiaries" in Article 43.46 It then proceeded to
phrase a broader more important issue, "whether or not a Member
State may adopt measures in order to prevent attempts by certain
of its nationals to evade domestic legislation by having recourse to
the possibilities offered by the Treaty." 47
In answering this question, the Court first discussed Articles 43
and 48 and stated:
The immediate consequence of [Articles 43 and 48] is
that... companies are entitled to carry on their business in
another Member State through an agency, branch or
subsidiary. The location of their registered office, central
administration or principal place of business serves as the
connecting factor with the legal system of a particular State
in the same way as does nationality in the case of a natural
person.48
The Court then expressly noted the argument, previously
discussed with regard to the Daily Mail opinion, that a Member
State was entitled to take measures to prevent nationals from
41 Id. See also Ebke, supra note 28, at 632-33 (noting that some scholars have
construed principal establishment to encompass primary establishment and
presenting the foundations of the debate).
42 See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, paras. 1-17 (detailing Denmark's attempt to
merge the issues of circumvention and principal establishment).
43 Id. para. 10.
44 Id. para. 11.
45 See id. para. 17 (citing Case 79/85, Segers v. Berijtsvereniging voor Bank-en
Verzekeringswegen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen, 1986 E.C.R. 2375).
46 EC Treaty, art. 43.
47 Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, para. 18.
48 Id. para. 20.
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
474 JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN THE EC [Vol. 27:2
improperly circumventing national legislation.49 It concluded that
intentional circumvention itself did not constitute an "abuse" of
the right of establishment. 50 The court's reason was as follows:
The provisions of the [EC] Treaty on freedom of
establishment are intended specifically to enable companies
formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
having their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the Community to
pursue activities in other Member States through an
agency, branch or subsidiary.5'
Although the Court ruled that circumvention was not illegal, it
simultaneously made a contrary suggestion by hinting at the
possibility of a different outcome had the Danish law dealt with
the "carrying on of certain trades, professions, or businesses" as
opposed to denying registration.
52
After this holding, the Court proceeded to consider, "whether
the national practice in question might not be justified."
53
Denmark asserted that its refusal to register Centros, which was
incompatible with Articles 43 and 48, was justified because
minimum capital requirements that prevented Centros' Danish
registration protected creditors.5 4 The Court rejected Denmark's
49 See id. para. 24 (citing multiple cases for this proposition, including Case
115/78, Knoors v. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1979 E.C.R. 399; Case
33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheld, 1974 E.C.R. 1299).
50 Id. para. 27.
51 Id. For a further explanation, see Eddy Wymeersch saw this language as
eliminating "the question whether the branch was not de facto a head office."
Eddy Wymeersch, Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, in
CoRPoRATIoNS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND BusINESS IN THE LAW 630, 632 (Th. Baums et
al. eds., 1999).
52 This suggestion, however, was somewhat puzzling because it was
inconsistent with the language of the Court that stated that the provisions were
designed to ensure that companies could pursue activities in other Member States.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. See also EC Treaty, art. 43 ("Freedom of
establishment shall include the right to ... manage undertakings. "). Ultimately,
this hint became the basis of the strict Member States' argument in Inspire Art. See
infra Section 2.4. (discussing how strict Member States argued that restrictive laws
not affecting company registration would not conflict with Freedom of
Establishment).
53 Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, para. 31.
54 See id. para. 32 (explaining the goal of protecting both public creditors as
well as other creditors).
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justification measures. It stated that these measures must be non-
discriminatory, justified by imperative requirements in the general
interest, suitable for securing the attainment of the objective, and
necessary.5 5 However, the Court implied that justifications would
succeed when they were first less restrictive. As an example, it
stated that Denmark could "mak[e] it possible in law for public
creditors to obtain the necessary guarantees." 56 It also suggested
that measures would be justified when a company abused the
freedom of establishment through fraudulent circumvention.57
2.2.1. A critical analysis and exploration of Centros
Centros led to significant academic debate. Many scholars
found the case surprising.58  However, Centros is doctrinally
consistent with the Court's jurisprudence in Daily Mail. Under
Daily Mail, one would have expected the Court to analyze the
Centros situation as follows.
Centros, incorporated in home Member State A, has a right to
establish a branch in host Member State B. Centros has such a right
to establish a branch even though it is transferring its central
management and control. This follows from the fact, as previously
mentioned, that the Daily Mail Court acknowledged that Daily
Mail's establishment in the Netherlands constituted a transfer of
central management and control. In Centros, host Member State B
was not a real seat state, but a state of incorporation 59 state. As
such, host Member State B had no argument, under Daily Mail, that
it granted legal personality to Centros. Since legal personality was
55 Id. para. 34.
56 Id. para. 37. The Court stated that Denmark could adopt "any appropriate
measure for preventing or penalising fraud ... where it has been established that
[manages] are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of the company, to
evade their obligations towards private or public creditors established on the
territory of a Member State concerned." Id. para. 38.
57 Id. para. 39.
58 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 627 (noting that some scholars actually viewed
this case as hailing the abolishment of the real seat theory.). Scholars of this sort
often additionally maintained that the "Delaware rule in Europe would entail the
much dreaded 'race to the bottom."' Wymeersch, supra note 51, at 631. But cf.
Ebke, supra note 28, at 660 (taking the view that Centros only expanded the scope
of the term "branch" in Article 43(1) and added little to the meaning of primary
establishment or the abolishment of the real seat theory).
59 See LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 25-27 (explaining that under the traditional
Anglo-Saxon state of incorporation theory, a company is viewed as a legal entity
of the law of the country of incorporation and is subject to its law).
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an additional condition for a Member State's restrictions not to
conflict with freedom of establishment, Denmark would violate
Centros's freedom of establishment.
However, despite the doctrinal consistency, it could be
believed that the Court in Centros was beginning to shift
philosophical gears.60 There are a number of arguments in support
of this. First, the Court's decision in Centros came down in favor of
the circumventing company, whereas the Daily Mail decision had
come down in favor of the Member State protecting its national
law.
Second, the Court in Centros specifically addressed whether
circumventing national law would justify a Member State's refusal
to give effect to EC law in the freedom of establishment context.
As was previously mentioned, the Daily Mail Court steered around
this issue even though it was addressed in the Advocate General's
opinion.61 One might have therefore thought, after Daily Mail, that
circumvention of national law was incompatible with the freedom
of establishment. In Centros, there is a clear answer-it is not
incompatible.
The Centros Court was interestingly almost forced into a
position where it had to address the dreaded question of the
relationship between circumvention of national law and the
freedom of establishment. Under the Daily Mail standard,
Denmark would have clearly infringed as there was no argument
that Centros had legal personality in a state of incorporation
nation. The Court therefore had two choices.
It could have held that legal personality was no longer
necessary to avoid conflict with the freedom of establishment and
eroded Daily Mail. This would have meant that a transfer of
management and control was sufficient to avoid such a conflict.
The other option was to leave Daily Mail intact doctrinally,
which meant deciding whether measures dealing with
circumvention of national law by themselves conflicted with the
freedom of establishment. Ironically, had the Court decided that
these measures did not conflict with freedom of establishment, it
would have eroded Daily Mail. Almost any transfer of central
management and control would have been susceptible to being
classified as an attempt to circumvent national law. This would
60 But cf. Wymeersch, supra note 51, at 632 (discussing how some scholars
took a more extreme view that Centros was a 'breakthrough' doctrine).
61 See supra text accompanying note 32.
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have effectively dispensed with the legal personality requirement.
Thus, in essence, the result in Centros was the only way to
maintain doctrinal consistency with Daily Mail. The price of this
doctrinal consistency was a philosophical concession. If it is
shocking, it is not because it is a major departure from Daily Mail.
Instead, it is a departure from 1970s cases like Knoors and Van
Binsberg.62 When the Daily Mail Court based its holding on the
concurrence of a company's transfer of central management and a
Member State conferring legal personality on a company, the E.C.J.
had already taken a major step toward this jurisprudence.
More important than what it doctrinally announced, the
Centros decision showed that it would not stretch doctrine to
satisfy a circumventive position. Since this case did not implicate
the issue of legal personality, it did little to clarify the tension
between companies as creatures of national law and beneficiaries
of the freedom of establishment. This tension ran even deeper than
circumvention issues.
2.3. Uberseering
Oberseering B.V. 63 was a limited company incorporated in the
Netherlands, a state of incorporation Member State.64 In 1990,
Uberseering contracted NCC GmbH,65 a private limited company
established in Germany (a real seat state), to perform work on
property that it had acquired in Germany. 66 Uberseering claimed
that NCC's work was defective and brought an action before the
Landgericht, the equivalent of a federal district court in Germany.67
The action was dismissed.68 German civil procedure 69 provided
62 See supra text accompanying note 59. It should, however, be noted that the
1970s precedent is not unequivocal. See supra text accompanying note 56.
63 See Limited v. BV: The Company Limited by Shares (Ltd.), http://www.hjc.nl/
(follow "English Summary" hyperlink) (comparing the B.V. limited company
structure in Holland to the U.K. limited company).
64 See Case C-208/00, Oberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 2 (discussing generally Uberseering BV
and their business activities).
65 See CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW - TOWARDS DEMOCRACY?
25-26 (1998) (explaining that the GmbH is a German private limited company and
describing its basic characteristics).
66 See Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, paras. 2, 6 (introducing the parties in the
action and the project management contract they entered into).
67 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 650 (explaining that the Landgericht is a German
District Court).
68 See Oberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 9 (noting that a higher regional
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that an action brought by a party which does not have legal
personality must be dismissed. 70 According to German law, a
company's legal capacity was determined by reference to the
applicable law in its "actual centre of administration." 71 The
Landgericht concluded that Uberseering had transferred its actual
center of administration to Dusseldorf merely because two German
nationals had acquired all the shares in Uberseering. 72 Its own
determination of a residence transfer was thus the basis for the
dismissal.
Since the actual center of administration was transferred to
Germany for purposes of German law, the Oberlandesgericht,
73
which is equivalent to a federal court of appeals in the United
States, concluded on the basis of its national law that German law
should apply. German law then required reincorporation in
Germany in order to bring legal proceedings. Since Uberseering
did not reincorporate in Germany, it was found to lack standing
and was denied the capacity to bring legal proceedings. 74
This case was later referred to the ECJ by the
Bundesgerichtshof, 75 the German equivalent of the U.S. Supreme
Court, under Article 234.76 Article 234 is the EC statute that sets
forth conditions under which the E.C.J. will have jurisdiction over
matters relating to preliminary rulings by Member States.
court upheld the dismissal).
69 See Zivilprozefgordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute], Jan. 30, 1877
(stating that a party needs capacity to bring suit).
70 See Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 3 (describing the possibility of
allowing Germany to use the concept of legal personality to deny legal capacity).
71 Id. para. 4.
72 See id. para. 7 (stating that in December 1994 two German nationals
residing in Dusseldorf acquired all the shares in Oberseering).
73 See id. para. 9 (stating that the Oberlandesgericht reviewed the
Landgericht's initial dismissal decision); see also Ebke, supra note 28, at 652 (noting
that the Oberlandesgericht is equivalent to the U.S. Court of Appeals).
74 See U1berseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 9 (arguing that as a company
incorporated under Netherlands law, Oberseering did not have legal capacity in
Germany and, consequently, could not bring legal proceedings there).
75 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 657 (explaining that the Bundesgerichtshof is
equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court).
76 Article 234 provides in relevant part that "[tihe Court of Justice shall have
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this
Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community and of the ECB; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies
established by an act of Council, where those statutes so provide."
EC Treaty, art. 234.
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Uberseering then asserted that Germany violated its freedom of
establishment by denying its legal capacity. Germany asserted that
freedom of establishment did not apply at all in this context.77
Germany invoked Daily Mail in particular.
78
The Court first distinguished Uberseering from Daily Mail on the
theory that the real seat doctrine did not confer "legal
personality." 79 Just because Germany determined that Gberseering
had made Germany its real seat, legal personality was not
automatically conferred. The Court then proceeded to address
whether Germany could find that 1Jberseering had transferred its
actual center of administration to Germany even though Holland,
its 'original' home Member State and the state in which it was
incorporated, had never called "[i]ts legal existence... in
question."8
0
Transferring central administration was the other circumstance
in Daily Mail that allowed a Member State to restrict companies,
without violating Articles 43 and 48. The Court did not give any
77 The court stated:
In limine and contrary to the submissions of both NCC and the German,
Spanish and Italian Governments, the Court must make clear that where
a company which is validly incorporated in one Member State ('A') in
which it has its registered office is deemed, under the law of a second
Member State ('B'), to have moved its actual centre of administration to
Member State B following the transfer of all its shares to nationals of that
State residing there, the rules which Member State B applies to that
company do not, as Community law now stands, fall outside the scope of
the Community provisions on freedom of establishment.
Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 52.
78 See id. para. 61 (noting that Germany tried to assimilate the Daily Mail
situation to justify denying legal capacity to Uberseering).
79 The court specifically stated:
It must be stressed that, unlike Daily Mail and General Trust, which
concerned relations between a company and the Member State under
whose laws it had been incorporated in a situation where the company
wished to transfer its actual centre of administration to another Member
State whilst retaining its legal personality in the State of incorporation,
the present case concerns the recognition by one Member State of a
company incorporated under the law of another Member State, such a
company being denied all legal capacity in the host Member State where
it takes the view that the company has moved its actual centre of
administration to its territory, irrespective of whether in that regard the
company actually intended to transfer its seat.
Id. para. 62.
80 Id. para. 63.
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definitive decision on whether Germany could so construe
Uberseering, but strongly implied that it could not.81  It then
suggested that neither the existence of legal personality nor the
transfer of the center of actual administration mattered. The Court
simply refused to apply the Daily Mail circumstances that allowed
Member State restrictions on immigrating companies by host
Member States. Thus it stated that "unlike the case before the
national court in this instance, Daily Mail and General Trust did not
concern the way in which one Member State treats a company
which is validly incorporated in another Member State and which
is exercising its freedom of establishment in the first Member
State."8 2
This rationale had the effect of narrowly confining Daily Mail to
its articulated conclusion in the context of company emigration.8 3
The Court asserted that the rationale for its decision was consistent
with that of Daily Mail, which had decided on the basis of the
principle that the company is a "creature of national law." 84
It then held that Uberseering had the right to rely on freedom
of establishment to contest the German law that had denied it legal
capacity as well as personality.8 5
In its next increment, the Court considered whether Germany
restricted Uberseering's freedom of establishment.8 6 It concluded
81 "[E]ven if the dispute... is seen as concerning a transfer of the actual
centre of administration." Id. para. 64.
82 Id. para. 66.
83 See Case C-81/87, The Queen v. HM Treasury and Comm'rs of Inland
Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 1-5483, para. 25
("Articles 52 and 58 [now Articles 43 and 48] of the Treaty, properly construed,
confer no right on a company incorporated under the legislation of a Member
State and having its registered office there to transfer its central management and
control to another Member State."). In the words of the Uberseering Court, the
Daily Mail Court
concluded that a Member State was able, in the case of a company
incorporated under its law, to make the company's right to retain its
legal personality under the law of that State subject to restrictions on the
transfer of the company's actual centre of administration to a foreign
country.
Lberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 70.
84 Uberseering, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 67.
85 See id. para. 76 ("It follows.., that Uberseering is entitled to rely on the
principle of freedom of establishment in order to contest the refusal of German
law to regard it as a legal person with the capacity to be a party to legal
proceedings.").
86 See id. para. 77 (arguing that the company seat principle as applied by
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that there was a restriction since the Netherlands, which was
lOberseering's initial home Member State, had continued to
recognize Uiberseering's legal personality.8 7 Moreover, it declared
that the German reincorporation requirement was "tantamount to
outright negation of freedom of establishment."8 8 Its rationale was
again that "a company exists only by virtue of the national
legislation which determines its incorporation and functioning."
89
2.3.1. A critical analysis and exploration of U0berseering
Clberseering is significant in EC freedom of establishment
jurisprudence for a number of reasons. Like the previous cases in
this line, the effect of the German law in lberseering would have
been to halt those companies trying to circumvent national law.
After the decision in Centros held that circumvention by itself could
not justify measures that restricted freedom of establishment,
Germany was foreclosed from arguing that its national law was
valid on this basis. As a result, Germany tried to see whether it
could use Daily Mail to maneuver around Centros. This required
placing the more fundamental issue of the bounds of national
company law before the Court.
Since Germany was a real seat state, it had a strong argument
that it could do so. This was in fact the first case in this line where
a company incorporated in home Member State A had immigrated
to host Member State B, a real seat state. In Centros, host Member
State B was a state of incorporation state. As such, Denmark had
no claim to conferring legal personality on Centros. Thus, the Daily
Mail circumstances could have been of no use in that context. Nor
could Germany's arguments have potentially availed it. A claim
that Centros transferred its central administration would not have
been enough, since the Court had already twice held that
establishing central administration was not incompatible with the
concept of a "branch" 90 that the Treaty had upheld. In the case of a
German law ensures that a company whose principal place of business is in
Germany has a fixed minimum share capital, something which is instrumental in
protecting parties with whom it enters into contracts and its creditors, and also
prevents distortions of competition).
87 See id. para. 80 (implying that a Member State's determination of legal
personality should not conflict with a prior Member State's determination on this
subject).
88 Id. para. 81.
89 Id.
90 See EC Treaty, art. 43 (applying the freedom of establishment to "branches").
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real seat state, however, it was at least arguable that a company's
legal personality transferred with its real seat. If incorporation in a
state of incorporation Member State conferred legal personality on
a company, then it stood to reason that a company's seat would
confer legal personality in a real seat Member State. This
hypothetical can be illustrated visually as follows.
Home Member State
A: State of
Incorporation Doctrine
under a
of State A
Host Member State B:
State of Incorporation
Doctrine
Centrosresidence
now in State
Host Member State B:
State of Incorporation
Doctrine Applied
Centros 
is
still under
law of State
A, despite
transfer
Figure 1: A Visualization of the Centros Case in Which
There is No Potential Basis for Host Member State B to
Assert Legal Personality
Figure 2: A Visualization of Uberseering 's Failed
Argument and How It Provided a Potential Basis for Host
Member State B to Assert Legal Personality
If Germany had succeeded in obtaining its desired result, real
seat Member States would have been armed against circumvention
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of their national laws.91 For nearly all such circumventions would
involve transfer of a company's central administration and, under
the real seat rationale, transfer of its legal personality.
In addition, prevailing on this issue would have armed real
seat Member States with an ex ante prophylactic measure.
Germany claimed that it could decide whether a company had
transferred its center of administration. Since it was a real seat
Member State, any transfer of central administration would have
given rise to legal personality. 92 As a result, Germany and real seat
Member States could have potentially fit almost anything into the
Daily Mail circumstances, as Germany attempted to do by arguing
that its nationals' acquiring all of Centros' shares constituted such
a transfer.
This is significant because it would have allowed real seat
Member States to block companies that they deemed de facto to
have circumvented national law, while state of incorporation
Member States would have had no such rights. Since a real seat
Member State in this scenario would have the right to block
companies incorporated in a state of incorporation Member State
when it merely deemed a company to have established its central
91 This aspect in particular historically prevented the competition of
jurisdictions in EC company law. Prior to this case, Garza noted that a real seat
Member State could
"require another member state's corporation having its principal place of
business ("seat," "siege," "[Sitz]") within its borders to incorporate
under its own laws.
Indeed, several member states do impose such a choice-of-corporate-law
requirement ("seat rule") to ensure that all corporations doing business
within their boundaries are subject to the same rules of corporate law.
As a result, the choice of corporate law is substantially restricted by these
member states."
Danny Ray Garza, Which Style Should Govern?, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 76,
78 (2002) (citation omitted).
92 Daily Mail and Centros had essentially held, as previously noted, that the
Member State could not determine on the basis of national law that an
establishment was not a branch if it was duly formed in another Member State
and fell within the scope of the Article 48 connecting factors. Eddy Wymeersch in
1999 had understandably assumed that Centros closed this issue. See Wymeersch,
supra note 51, at 633 ("As far as the Treaty's freedoms are concerned, national
bodies could not refuse to recognize foreign bodies on the basis that they do not
have sufficient links with the Community, or that they do not meet the criteria for
recognition under national law."). Germany's argument in Uberseering would
have effectively reversed this rule for real seat states.
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administration in a real seat Member State, many companies
would be forced to recognize their own incorporation in real seat
Member States if they did not wish to paradoxically face the grave
consequences of losing legal capacity and forced dissolution.93
This could have had two important effects. First, it might have
offset the benefits obtained by the more relaxed laws that Centros-
like companies could obtain in certain state of incorporation
Member States. Second, it might have made it wholly unfeasible
for these and other companies with a remotely colorable central
administration in a real seat Member State to not incorporate in
real seat Member States.
In the first scenario, the effect would have been to preserve the
existing real seat and state of incorporation framework in the EU.
In the second scenario, it would have tended to either establish the
dominance of, or export, the real seat doctrine at the expense of the
incorporation doctrine.
Real seat Member States would have had the power to control
which scenario obtained to some degree. If they imposed very
harsh measures in the case of transfer, the second scenario would
have been more likely to obtain. If the measures were less harsh,
the first scenario would have been more likely to have obtained.
In addition, they could have further controlled this by having
the power to decide when there was a transfer of central
administration. They could have simply found such a transfer
when they suspected circumvention. When they suspected
circumvention, they could have imposed a measure that was
sufficient to eliminate the foreign company's benefit from
circumvention, without going further. Preserving the status quo,
given the European fear of a race to laxity, is likely all that they
would have intended. The chart on the following page presents an
illustration of this scenario.
The Court's conclusion is not shocking, given the inherent
danger of allowing real seat Member States to simply assert legal
personality over companies and to require them to reincorporate.
As a result, it is understandable that the Court forcefully declared
that the German reincorporation rule was "tantamount" to the
legal personality concept.94 This was not truly inconsistent with
Daily Mail to the extent that it could not resolve the eventual
93 See infra Section 3.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
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unavoidable conflict of two national legal personalities.
95
Figure 3: What if Real Seat Member States Could Have
Determined Residence Transfer and Legal Personality so as
to Deny Legal Capacity to Foreign Companies?
PossIbility #1: Real Seat Pos.blUty #2: Real Seat
Membe Staes relyMember States Rclendessly
Determine Residence Transfer Determine Residence Transfer
Seekn Statso aivntaionTeRaaetlebrSae ~tbil
Benefits of Relaxed Law Am Not Dotninance of the Real Seat Theory and
Sufficiently High- Export Strict Law.
Situated in a netherworld between Centros and Daily Mail, the
Court had two options in this regard. In the first case, it could
have applied legal personality to uphold the German law. This
would have resulted in the scenario described above where real
seat doctrine would either prevail in the EU, or where the status
quo would be maintained.96  It also might have eroded an
assumption already implicit in Daily Mail that the legal personality
of the home Member State prevailed.
95 See Eddy Wymeersch, The Transfer of the Company's Seat in European
Company Law 18 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 08/2003,
2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=384802.
It is important to note-as [Ulberseering] recalls-that the court's holding
in [Daily Mail] is framed in terms of a state's powers within its own
jurisdiction, and not in terms of rules relating to a cross border
relationship where the Treaty's freedom of establishment limits the
powers of a member state vis-1-vis companies originating from another
member state.
Id.
96 See supra text accompanying Figure 3.
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In the second case, it could have and did apply legal
personality to find that the German law violated Uberseering's
freedom of establishment. The immediate result of its decision is
that, at a minimum, host Member State anti-circumvention
measures are severely limited where companies immigrate from
state of incorporation Member States, since Centros further limits
these measures in the context of a state of incorporation host
Member State. This effectively cripples the real seat doctrine.
Moreover, the freedom of establishment will even apply in this
context where there is a transfer of the central administration or
management. This follows from the fact that in all three of these
cases, the Court accepted that the transfer of the company's central
administration did not affect its freedom of establishment or its
status in the host state as a "branch." 97 This fully obfuscates the
distinction between primary and secondary establishment. 98
Thus, companies that incorporate in state of incorporation
Member States appear to have the carte blanche to transfer,99 with
minimal fear of anti-circumvention measures, into other Member
States. The only limitations on their ability to transfer after this
case were the justification doctrine in Centros and the emigration
circumstances in Daily Mail. This allowed new companies who
planned to do all or most of their business in a host Member State
to take advantage of the more relaxed company laws of various
other Member States. It is inevitable that certain incorporation
Member States 00 like the U.K. with relaxed company laws will
now export their standards through new incorporations.
97 Although the Court in Uberseering did not accept that its central
administration had been transferred, it asserted that such a transfer would not
have affected the decision outcome. See Case C-208/00, l-berseering BV v. Nordic
Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 64 (noting
that even in this scenario the interpretation that the German government put forth
of Daily Mail was incorrect).
98 But see Ebke, supra note 28 (reserving considerable doubt as to whether
Centros significantly abolished the distinction).
99 See Garza, supra note 91, at 78 (noting that this brings the EU much closer
to the "full faith and credit clause" scenario in the United States).
100 Real seat states with lax laws should be able to export law as well.
U1berseering appears to consider the first Member State to grant legal personality as
the Member State under whose law a company was duly formed and therefore as
the state falling within the Daily Mail legal personality concept. See supra text
accompanying note 88.
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2.4. Inspire Art
Inspire Art Ltd.101 was a private limited company incorporated
in the United Kingdom that established a branch in the
Netherlands. 10 2 Its sole director, who had independent decision
making capacity, was located in the Netherlands.103 In addition,
Inspire Art Ltd. traded almost exclusively within the
Netherlands. 104
The Netherlands imposed on it certain requirements by the
WFBV.105 The WFBV requirements were an attempt by the
Netherlands, a state of incorporation Member State, to deal with
the problem of formally foreign companies. 10 6 Various articles
imposed obligations on these companies. Articles 2 to 5 of the
WFBV impose on formally foreign companies various obligations
concerning the company's registration in the commercial register,
an indication of that status in all the documents produced by it, the
minimum share capital and the drawing-up, production and
publication of the annual documents. The WFBV also provides for
penalties in case of noncompliance with those provisions.
10 7
Inspire Art Ltd. contended that it was not a formally foreign
company. As a result, it never "registered as such in the
commercial register of the host State" 10 8 as required by Article 2 of
the WFBV. In addition, it contended that the WFBV provisions
101 See Al Company Services Limited, supra note 17 (providing information
about limited companies in the United Kingdom).
102 See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam
v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 2 (providing background
information about the action).
103 See id. para. 34 (stating that the company's sole director, whose domicile is
in The Hague [Netherlands], is authorized to act alone and independently in the
name of the company).
104 See id. para. 36 (explaining that the Chamber of Commerce took the view
that that indication was mandatory on the ground that Inspire Art Ltd. traded
exclusively in the Netherlands).
105 Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse Vennootschappen ("WFBV") (Law on
Formally Foreign Companies), Staatsblad 1997 No. 697 (Dec. 17, 1997).
106 See Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R 1-10155, para. 22 ("Article 1 of the WFBV defines
a formally foreign company as a capital company formed under laws other than
those of the Netherlands and having legal personality, which carries on its
activities entirely or almost entirely in the Netherlands and also does not have any
real connection with the State within which the law under which the company
was formed applies. ). "Formally foreign company" thus encompassed
companies like Centros.
107 Id. para. 23.
108 Id. para. 24.
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were contrary to Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.109
The Kantongerecht,l 0 the lowest level court in a four-tiered
Dutch hierarchy, held that Inspire Art was a formally foreign
corporation, but refrained from ruling on the freedom of
establishment issue. Instead, it referred this issue to the ECJ."'
The ECJ interpreted this issue as whether Articles 43 and 48 of the
EC Treaty precluded the WFBV from attaching additional
conditions to establishment in a host Member State where a
company had intent to circumvent stricter national company law
requirements and where a company carried all or most of its
activities on in the host state without a genuine connection to the
Member State under whose law it was formed.112
The Court first did not consider the relation of certain WFBV
disclosure provisions regarding branches opened in a Member
State by companies covered by the First Directive and governed by
the law of another Member State. This was because the Eleventh
Directive,113 which subjects branches to disclosure requirements,
preempted the field.14
The Court, however, did consider the WFBV provisions that
did not fall within the scope of the Eleventh Directive.115 These
were the minimum capital requirements rules." 6 The Netherlands
109 See id. para. 37 (stating that this was an argument in the alternative to its
principal argument that it did not meet the conditions of Article 1 of the WFBV).
110 See Pieter Ruitinga & Anthony J. Mavronicolas, Dutch Jurisdiction in
Transportation Matters, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 61, 61 (noting that the Dutch hierarchy
consists of sixty-two cantonal courts).
111 See Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R 1-10155, para. 39 (stating the two questions
referred to the ECJ for further review)
112 See id. para. 52 (stating the issues the national court seeks in substance to
ascertain).
113 See Council Directive 89/666, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36 (outlining the provisions
of the Eleventh Directive which discusses branch disclosures); see also VANESSA
EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 212-18 (1999) (providing an overview of the scope
and major issues relating to the Eleventh Directive, which subjects branches to
certain disclosure requirements).
114 See Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, paras. 55, 69 ("It follows that, without
affecting the information obligations imposed on branches under social or tax law,
or in the field of statistics, harmonisation of the disclosure to be made by
branches, as brought about by the Eleventh Directive, is exhaustive ... ").
115 See id. para. 73 (explaining that several provisions of the WFBV do not fall
within the scope of the Eleventh Directive).
116 See id. (providing that those rules relate to the minimum capital required,
both at the time of registration and for so long as a formally foreign company
exists).
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and Germany, inter alia, asserted that these WFBV provisions did
not violate Articles 43 and 48.117 First, they argued that the WFBV
dealt neither with company formation nor registration and thus
did not implement the freedom of establishment.1 8 Rather, they
maintained that the WFBV merely imposed additional obligations
that related to a company's "business activities and the running of
the company ... "119 As such, the provisions fell outside of the
scope of Centros, which had distinguished "rules governing the
formation of companies" 120 from "rules concerning the carrying on
of certain trades, professions, or businesses. " 121
Second, they stated that Daily Mail supported their position.122
They interpreted Daily Mail to stand for the proposition that
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty did not restrict a host Member
State's power to "determine the relevant factor connecting a
company to their national legal order." 123  This echoed the
aforementioned argument in Uberseering that a Member State could
determine when it conferred "legal personality"124 on a company.
They also asserted that they were free to apply national law as the
rules relating to freedom of establishment had not led to
harmonization. 2 5
Third, Germany and Austria argued that Articles 43 and 48
were not designed to enable the aforementioned undertakings of
117 See id. para. 74 (stating that the Chamber of Commerce and the Dutch,
German, Italian, and Austrian Governments are of the view that application of
provisions such as those of the WFBV is not contrary to Articles 43 EC and 48 EC).
118 See id. para. 75 (arguing that the validity of those companies is in fact
recognized and they are not refused registration, with the result that freedom of
establishment is not compromised).
119 Id. para. 81.
120 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459, para. 26.
121 Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 76.
122 See id. para. 83 (pointing out that the Chamber of Commerce and the
Dutch, German, and Austrian Governments refer to the judgment in Daily Mail
and the relevant case law).
123 Id.
124 For a discussion of the relationship between a Member State conferring
legal personality on a company and its ability to restrict a company without
violating the freedom of establishment, see supra Sections 2.1.1 and 2.3.1.
125 See Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 102 (arguing that in this respect
the Member States retain the right to take action against "brass-plate companies,"
that classification being in the circumstances of the case inferred from the lack of
any real connection with the State of formation).
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"brass-plate companies." 126 They asserted that formally foreign
companies should fall outside of the freedom of establishment
because they were primary establishments. 127 This assertion went
further than Denmark's assertion in Centros, which had then
confined itself to contending that a "principal establishment"
128 fell
outside of the right to set up "agencies, branches or subsidiaries,"
rather than that there was no primary establishment right under
the freedom of establishment.
Fourth, the Netherlands and Germany, inter alia, asserted the
abusive or fraudulent improper circumvention justification
measure that Centros implied was allowed under the freedom of
establishment. 129 They broadly interpreted the holding in Centros,
which did not allow a host Member State to refuse registration to a
company having legal personality under another home Member
State, and found it to not apply. This was because the host
Member State, unlike in Centros, did not refuse to register or
recognize a company, but only provided for limited "preventive
measures and penalties."
130
The Court rejected the host Member States' first argument that
the WFBV merely dealt with the carrying on of business and thus
did not violate the freedom of establishment. It concluded that the
WFBV, even though it dealt with the day-to-day operations of
existing companies, adversely impacted the formation of
companies to the extent that formally foreign companies like
Inspire Art Ltd. carried on their activities "exclusively, or almost
exclusively, in the Netherlands."
131
It then rejected their argument that Daily Mail permitted
Member States to assert legal personality over companies, or to
126 Id. para. 84.
127 See id. para. 85 (arguing that by placing the sole center of its activities in a
State other than that to which it formally belongs, a company must be considered
to be primarily established in that first State).
128 See Ebke, supra note 28, at 629 (noting a debate that existed as to whether
primary establishment was encompassed by principal establishment at the time of
Centros).
129 See Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 86 (acknowledging that the
Dutch and German case law allows governments to prevent a party from
"improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community
Law"); see also Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1496 (stating refusal to register the branch of a company formed in
another Member State violates Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty for Member States).
130 Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-10155, para. 88.
131 Id. para. 100.
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determine the connecting factor to national origin. It stated:
[U]nlike the case at issue in the main proceedings, Daily
Mail and General Trust concerned relations between a
company and the Member State under the laws of which it
had been incorporated in a situation where the company
wished to transfer its actual centre of administration to
another Member State whilst retaining its legal personality
in the State of incorporation.1 32
Finally, based on the above, the Court concluded that the
WFBV restricted freedom of establishment under Articles 43 and
48.133 It then turned to the question of justification for the
minimum capital and directors' liability provisions contained
within the WFBV.
The Netherlands argued that the provisions regarding the
paying-up and maintenance of minimum capital were justified by
both Article 46134 and by "overriding reasons relating to the public
interest." 135 It asserted that they protected creditors and others
against the risk of fraudulent insolvency.136 In addition, it argued
that the directors' liability provisions were justified by the fact that
Member States, absent harmonization, had broad discretion in
applying penalties for noncompliance of national law.137 They also
argued that they were justified because directors were responsible
for the proper conduct of company matters.138
The Court summarily dismissed any justifications under
Article 46.139 It classified the justifications as "aims of protecting
132 Id. para. 103.
133 See id. para. 104 (concluding that the provisions of the WFBV relating to
minimum capital and to directors' liability constitute restrictions on freedom of
establishment as guaranteed by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty).
134 Article 46 reads in relevant part "The provisions of this chapter and
measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for
special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security
or public health." EC Treaty, art. 46.
135 Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 108.
136 Id. para. 110.
137 See id. para. 111 (explaining that directors' liability constitutes an
appropriate sanction for noncompliance with the provisions of the WFBV).
138 See id. para. 112 (arguing that directors are to be expected to incur liability
if the company does not comply with the provisions of the WFBV).
139 See id. para. 131 (stating that none of the arguments put forward by the
Netherlands Goverru-nent with a view to justifying the legislation at issue in the
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creditors, combating improper recourse to freedom of
establishment, and protecting both effective tax inspections and
fairness in business dealings... ."140 These had to be evaluated on
the basis of overriding reasons.
141
Second, it considered the above justifications. Protecting
creditors failed because creditors were already put on notice that
they were dealing with U.K. companies.142 Combating improper
recourse to freedom of establishment failed as Centros had affirmed
that a company not conducting any business in the Member State
of its formation could circumvent a host Member State's national
law to take advantage of more relaxed rules.143 The Court in
Centros had thus already held that circumvention did not
constitute abuse or fraud.144
However, the Court took an ambiguous position with regard to
fairness in business dealings and the efficiency of tax inspections.
It implied, without stating anything affirmatively, that these might
be justifications, but dismissed them in the absence of evidence as
to "efficacy, proportionality and non-discrimination."
145
Finally, the Court never considered the independent legality of
the directors' liability provisions. Since the minimum capital
provisions were incompatible with the freedom of establishment,
the Court held that its penalties were incompatible as well.
46
Thus, it remained unclear whether director liability could be used
as a means to discourage circumvention in the proper context.
main proceedings falls within the ambit of Article 46 of the EC Treaty).
140 Id. para. 132.
141 The court earlier noted that the criteria for evaluating justifications on the
basis of overriding reasons: "[T]hey must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the public interest;
they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they
pursue, and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it ..
Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 133.
142 See id. para. 135 (pointing out that Inspire Art clearly holds itself out as a
company governed by the law of England and Wales and not as a Netherlands
company).
143 See id. paras. 137-39 (discussing treatment of similar issues in Centros and
other settled case law).
144 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459, para. 27 (holding that circumvention by itself was not an abuse of
the freedom of establishment).
145 Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 140.
146 Id. para. 141.
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2.4.1. Analysis and exploration of Inspire Art
Some lawyers in the EC have hailed this case as opening the
path to a competition of jurisdictions. 147 However, in many
respects, there is nothing particularly new or significant at work in
this decision. First, Uberseering would seem to have clearly already
refuted the Member States' primary establishment argument.148 At
the same time, Inspire Art is the first case where the Court explicitly
recognized that the freedom of establishment entailed a right of
primary establishment.
Second, the Court refuted Germany's and Denmark's argument
that a Member State could assert legal personality over a company.
Nothing is factually new in this respect. Rather, it appears as if
certain Member States merely attempted to bypass Uberseering's
decision that a Member State could not determine legal personality
when a company was already a creature of another Member State
by shifting terms to the "connecting factor" language left
outstanding from Daily Mail.
In addition, the company's transfer was more legitimate in this
case than in lberseering, where Germany had found transfer on the
mere basis of share acquisition. However, Uberseering never rested
on whether there was an actual transfer.149 It held that even if there
had been a transfer, Daily Mail was essentially limited to the
emigration context. Thus, the connecting factor argument was
147 Matthias Hirschmann and Dirk Ellerkman, two practitioners in the EC at
the law firm Lovells, wrote:
In its Inspire Art decision of 30 September 2003, it held that a corporate
entity validly established in one member state may transfer its
administrative seat to another member state without having to comply
with the second member state's stricter corporate legislation. The
decision is expected to increase competition between legal types of
company [sic] throughout Europe and puts further strain on the
minimum capitalisation and strict capital maintenance rules of German
company law.
Matthias Hirschmann & Dirk Ellerkman, Inspire Art: End of German GmbH?,
Practical Law Company (2003), available at http://www.practicallaw.com/4-107-
1754.
148 Even Daily Mail had implied that transferring the central administration to
a non-set state was a protected form of establishment. After Uberseering, where
the "transfer" was to a seat state, the primary establishment argument is
extremely weak.
149 See Case C-208/00, Oberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 64 (refusing to base its holding on a
transfer situation).
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clearly stale from the outset.
The argument that national anti-circumvention measures could
be applied under the abuse exception to freedom of establishment
also is not novel. Centros previously held that a company not
having carried on any business in the Member State under whose
law it was formed that intended to circumvent a host Member
State's national law did not per se fall within the scope of the abuse
exception.15
0
However, Germany and Denmark's argument did present one
important issue. Centros had left open the possibility that the
abuse exception to freedom of establishment would apply when
carrying on trades, professions, or businesses as opposed to the
company registration scenario.'
51
The Netherlands in Inspire Art tried to capitalize on this
opening to argue that Inspire Art Ltd.'s failure to comply with the
WFBV was abusive because the WFBV didn't concern the
registration scenario, but only related to carrying on trades,
professions, or businesses as the WFBV never required registration
or refused recognition. Since the penalty for noncompliance was
merely joint and several director liability, with the company itself
not incurring any penalty, the Netherlands could strongly argue
that the WFBV in this respect merely imposed additional
"administrative" obligations. 52 This was clearly a very strong
argument from a technical point of view, especially since the Court
in Centros had suggested that less restrictive measures than denial
of registration would be permitted in order to allow creditors to
obtain the necessary guarantees.1 53 The Inspire Art decision, which
rejected the creditor argument, thus reduced the protecting
creditor justification to meaninglessness since creditors would be
considered protected when they were merely put on notice that
they were dealing with U.K. companies. 154
If the argument had succeeded, the impact with regard to
jurisdictional competition in the EU would have surely been
150 See supra text accompanying note 51.
151 See supra text accompanying note 52.
152 See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam
v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 99 (opinion of the Advocate-General)
(explaining how the WFBV is in effect making it "necessary to satisfy the
requirements imposed on the formation of a limited liability company in the
Netherlands" by refusing to recognize companies established under foreign law).
153 See supra text accompanying note 57.
154 See supra text accompanying note 143.
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severe. Before analyzing the precise implications of this argument,
it is worthwhile to note that the goal of the anti-competition
Member States following Centros was to find a way of preventing
state of incorporation Member States with relaxed laws from
exporting their rules.
aberseering was the first attempt. Rather than run head on into
existing circumvention jurisprudence, the anti-competition
Member States were forced to run backwards to Daily Mail in an
attempt to capitalize on the more fundamental tension between
national company law and freedom of establishment. This was
staged through the technicalities of the real seat doctrine.
After the effort to use Daily Mail failed, the anti-competition
Member States were effectively pinned against the wall. Their only
judicial recourse to the problem was to take the dangerous path
toward the quintessence of Centros itself. If they succeeded, Centros
and jurisdictional competition would be severely crippled. This
attempt was reflected in Inspire Art.
If these Member States had prevailed, it would have meant that
minimum capital requirements would have fallen within the scope
of carrying on trades, professions, or businesses. The penalty for
noncompliance was director liability, provided that there was no
refusal of recognition or registration. This, in turn, would have
meant, namely, two things.
First, it virtually would have ensured that codermination
requirements 55 could be required with a similar penalty. This is
because codermination 56 more clearly would fall within the scope
of carrying on trades, professions, or businesses, since it relates to
day-to-day employee participation. Second, more importantly, it
would have generally tended to allow Member States to export
stricter national law rules.
In this respect, there were two possible scenarios. To illustrate
this, consider the minimum capital requirements. First, a formally
foreign company could comply. To do so, it would have to
155 For a discussion of a German codermination law, see Peter E. Quint, The
Constitutional Guarantees of Social Welfare in the Process of German Unification, 47
AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 307 (1999) (explaining that codetermination grants employees
significant representation on boards of major companies). But cf. LOMBARDO, supra
note 8, at 40 (noting that codermination differs significantly among European
states as some workers enjoy protection in the context of company law instead of
labor law).
156 See LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 129-33 (describing the evolution of
codermination following the Second World War).
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maintain the requisite level of minimum capital in the Member
State where it incorporated to take advantage of more relaxed
legislation. This would have had the effect not only of imposing
the stricter rule on the company when it does business in the host
Member State, as the Centros requirement would have done, but in
the home Member State of incorporation as well.1 57 As a result,
strict law would in certain issues get exported when companies
sought to circumvent other issues. This would have resulted in a
two-way exportation, which the real seat Member States might
have found marginally equitable.
Second, a formally foreign company could choose not to
comply. In this case, directors would face liability. Although the
company would then take advantage of the upside of the relaxed
legislation, its directors would face the risk. Since directors would
tend not to want personal downside for the company's upside,
they would be less likely to choose noncompliance. As a result,
there would be no incentive to form formally foreign companies
for the purposes of circumvention.
If they did choose noncompliance, companies could attempt to
offset director risk. This could be accomplished namely through
option compensation or indemnification. These mechanisms
might, however, have been met with substantial opposition on the
part of the anti-competition Member States. Since the justification
for interfering with freedom of establishment would be fraud in
this scenario, it seems unlikely that their opposition would prevail
as offsetting director risk would not decrease creditor payment.
Moreover, since companies are anyhow liable, it is not clear that
they would incur significantly greater risk. This might have led to
a situation where anti-competition Member States ensured that
creditors got paid, while companies still could take advantage of
more relaxed rules.1 58 However, the increased agency costs would
still tend to maintain the status quo.
157 Of course, in the case of purely intrastate companies, this scenario would
have had no import. Although this would not have affected purely intrastate
companies, most multinational companies would have been impacted, thereby at
least tending to substantially export strict law.
158 This outcome would clearly have been much less effective for anti-
competition Member States in codermination, where protection of creditors is not
at stake. As such, it would have only partially met their expectations. On the
other hand, they could have more easily opposed option compensation and
indemnification on this ground. This would have led toward retaining the status
quo.
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It is anybody's guess which of these two scenarios would have
obtained. At a minimum, this would have maintained the status
quo, or a compromise situation. If fully successful, anti-
competition Member States would have sometimes exported
15 9
strict rules throughout the EC. In this respect, the potential
outcomes were very similar to those in Gberseering.
Figure 4: What if the WFBV Provisions on Minimum Capital
Requirements Had Fallen within Centros's Exception
Relating to the Carrying on of Trades?
Company's Cost of the Strict Law
Does Not Outweigh the Benefit of
the Relaxed Law.
Status Quo Matitains and Exporting
Law ts Minimal. The Incteased
Agency Cost Likely Does Not
Outweigh the Benefit of Relaxed Law.
One impact then of the Court's decision in Inspire Art is that it
again avoided a possible exporting of strict law, or at a minimum,
avoided retaining the status quo. This is particularly significant
because the anti-competition Member States may have finally
exhausted their roads for accomplishing either of these purposes,
at least as far as current jurisprudential doctrine is concerned. This
is visually illustrated below.
2.4.2. The aftermath of Inspire Art: Jurisdictional competition in
the EC?
Despite the lack of major published analyses, many
practitioners have therefore assumed that Inspire Art will definitely
159 Most likely, it would not have exported strict rules very often as Member
States would have no incentive to incorporate in one Member State only to
transfer central administration to another Member State.
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open the road to jurisdictional competition in Europe.160 This is
probably true, at least, with regard to allowing the possibility of
competition over minimum capital requirements in the case of new
incorporations. This is so for two reasons.
First, two major cases are now on point holding that neither
Daily Mail's legal personality circumstance nor the freedom of
establishment abuse exception (even when the circumvention
measure appears to relate to the carrying on of trades, professions,
or businesses) allow anti-circumvention measures in minimum
capital requirements cases in immigrations. Thus, anti-competition
Member States in this regard have come close to running out of
doctrinal options.
Second, the Court appears to have held in Inspire Art that
requirements "mandatorily"161 applied to formally foreign
companies that have the "effect of impeding the exercise by those
companies of the freedom of establishment" 62 fall within the scope
of registration requirements, not within carrying on trades,
professions, or businesses. This tautologically means that
minimum capital requirements fall within the registration
requirements' scope.
However, Centros and (Iberseering merely construe one area of
the controversy relating to relaxed rules. Most major areas, such as
codermination,163 have yet to be construed. Clearly, the anti-
competition Member States after beginning the fight in the area of
minimum capital in Centros were not going to fight off Centros by
putting codermination at stake. A victory in minimum capital
requirements in Inspire Art would have effectively protected
codermination whereas a defeat would not have explicitly
160 See, e.g., Hirschmann & Ellerkman, supra note 147 (suggesting that Inspire
Art is expected to lead to jurisdictional competition).
161 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 100.
162 Id. para. 101.
163 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 353 (presenting a theoretical discussion
regarding the future of codermination). Part of why codermination has not yet
been construed is because the application of codermination rules to a branch of a
foreign company is contrary to German law. In addition, codetermination is
currently linked to the company statute itself. See Wymeersch, supra note 51, at
639 (stating that Germany could alternatively apply a comparable measure at the
branch level). However, this does not mean that Germany would not in the future
try to change the structure of codermination, particularly as it can clearly no
longer, after Uberseering, require incorporation of a company's central
administration in its state.
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destroyed it.
The anti-competition Member States in Inspire Art clearly
suffered a very serious defeat. One of the major issues in the
jurisdictional competition is now lost to these Member States.
However, they have cleverly and craftily proceeded in their quest
thus far, slowly yielding one piece at a time.
In the hypothetical codermination situation, one possibility
would be a challenge based on Daily Mail's notion that a Member
State can determine whether companies possess legal personality
under its national law. This would clearly fail after (Iberseering,
which was not based in minimum capital and which anyhow very
firmly limited the use of Daily Mail.
The other possibility would be to lodge an abuse exception
challenge under Centros. This clearly has a better chance of success
than the Daily Mail challenge. However, the Court in Inspire Art
gave some indications that such a challenge would fail in the case
of codermination. This is because a national law that seemed to
prima facie be concerned with the carrying on of trades, professions,
or businesses was held to anyhow restrict freedom of
establishment because it was mandatorily applied, and its effect
was to harm formation of companies.164
On the other hand, all codermination requirements that didn't
refuse registration or recognition to companies would seem to be
concerned with the carrying on of trades, professions, or
businesses. This is because codermination applies in the day-to-
day life of workers in companies. As such, it is more properly
within the scope of the "carrying on" exception.
It is unclear how the Court would resolve this conflict. The
new "effects" doctrine suggests that it would be resolved against
the anti-competition Member States. Under Inspire Art, it appears
that mandatory requirements that affect formation simply do not
fall within the scope of "carrying on." On the other hand, the
Court might logically limit this doctrine as it previously limited
Daily Mail.
This could be done by simply ,deciding that mandatory
codetermination requirements, absent registration requirements or
164 See Inspire Art, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 100 ("The effect of the WFBV is,
in fact, that the Netherlands company law rules on minimum capital and
directors' liability are applied mandatorily to foreign companies such as Inspire
Art when they carry on their activities exclusively, or almost exclusively, in the
Netherlands.").
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denial of recognition, do not per se affect company formation.
Certainly, there is a case to be made that they don't impact initial
capital investment to the same degree. Such a decision cannot be
ruled out as codetermination requirements seem to philosophically
fit more properly in the "carrying on" exception that the Court
might stretch in this direction. This would be especially true if it
felt that labor were a more important "stakeholder" 165 interest than
creditors.
If it did so, limiting the effects doctrine in some way or other
would have interesting effects on jurisdictional competition. Once
again, in a WFBV-like scenario, the formally foreign company
could choose to comply with the requirement. A company that
complied would have to adopt codetermination in the Member
State under whose law it was formed. This would actually
produce partial laxity, in addition to an exportation of certain strict
laws, since companies would have some incentive to actually
incorporate in order to take advantage of favorable minimum
capital requirements. Once again, the strict Member States would
have likely found this situation marginally equitable.
On the other hand, a company could also not comply with the
codetermination requirement. In this event, the anti-competition
Member State would seek director liability. The company would
again try to counter by providing indemnification. However,
indemnification would possibly fail in this scenario as Member
States could employ consistent arguments to block it.
Assuming that they could not block it or that option
compensation could be sufficiently employed to offset director
risk, noncompliance may obtain. If the penalty imposed were
director liability, as in Inspire Art, anti-competition Member States
might fail to force companies to adopt codermination
requirements. However, noncompliance would obtain only at the
price of increased agency costs. These costs could very well
165 See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 123 (2002) ("This term loosely refers to all parties
with a stake in the firm who are not shareholders and includes investors,
employees, creditors, and suppliers."). See generally THE CORPORATION AND ITS
STAKEHOLDERS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (Max B.E. Clarkson ed.,
1998) (presenting collected essays on stakeholder theory); Jeswald W. Salacuse,
Corporate Governance, Culture and Convergence: Corporations American Style or With
a European Touch?, 9 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. OF THE AM. 33, 46 (2003) (noting that
stakeholder theory is recognized in Europe, excepting the U.K.); LOMBARDO, supra
note 8, at 79 (noting that stakeholder theory in strong stakeholder states even
takes into account the interest of the State).
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countervail any resultant benefit from relaxed law.
If the Court limits the effects doctrine at codermination, a full
race for laxity would thus not ensue, since compliance would
result in a two-way exporting of law, while noncompliance would
likely result in no exporting of law. This is visually illustrated
below.
Figure 5: What if Strict Member States Were to Successfully
Argue that the Effects Doctrine Does not Extend to Co-
Determination?
cotmnation Aog he Stitea
opnts Suteig te Eeorto
teRelaxed Law.Hv C,
Advamntage ohi Resxed iaw
Siams Quo Maintains and Exporting
Law is Minimal. The Incitased
Agency Cost Likely Does Not
Outweigh the Benefit of Relaxed Law.
3. FACTORS LIMITING JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
Although Member States with strict rules clearly have no
power to restrict newly formed companies from becoming formed
under the law of a Member State with relaxed rules and exporting
those rules, a full jurisdictional competition scenario would require
that long established companies in the strict Member States also
have the possibility of changing jurisdictions.1 66
Company law rules regarding dissolution might effectively
prevent a company's ability to change jurisdictions. One
possibility for restricting emigration establishments is for strict
166 See Wymeersch, supra note 51, at 637 (noting that cross-border mergers are
an effective tool, without a comparable European instrument, for accomplishing
jurisdictional transfers in the United States).
20061
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
502 JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN THE EC [Vol. 27:2
Member States to impose dissolution on the emigrating company.
A strict Member State would thus withdraw its legal personality
where a company formed under its laws wished to emigrate.
67
Existing companies would have to either dissolve and
reincorporate at a prohibitively high cost or not establish branches.
This is so for the following reasons.
Dissolutions are not financially feasible for companies. First,
Ronald Gilson notes that under Germany's real seat law, a
company's changing of jurisdiction of incorporation is treated as
liquidation and results in corporate level capital gains tax on the
appreciation in assets. Thus, for large corporations, the added
value of relaxed law in another Member State would most likely
not be worth the tax cost.168 In addition, three Danish scholars
point out:
A change of nationality requiring dissolution in the state of
origin, whereby assets are transferred to the shareholders,
and re-incorporation in the receiving state, involving a
transfer of assets to the newly formed company, is costly
and not a feasible method. The company law rules will
treat it as a different company, and therefore, contracts,
loans, etc. cannot be assigned to the new company without
the consent of the creditors, or contracting parties. 169
As a result, companies who were formed under the laws of a
strict Member State could not change their jurisdiction. First, this
could prevent jurisdictional competition in the case of new
companies, as the Centros connecting factor requires that a
company be duly formed in the home Member State. It is doubtful
that all Member States would restrict emigration. Presumably, at
least one Member State would seek to become the Delaware of
Europe.170
More likely, the Daily Mail emigration scenario would bar only
existing companies from exiting. Wymeersch, however, questions
167 See id. at 645 (asserting that so restricting emigration could lead to an
immigration jurisprudence that was purposeless).
168 Gilson, supra note 1, at 356.
169 Mette Neville et al., Free Movement of Companies under Company Law, Tax
Law and EU Law, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPANIES AND COMPANY LAWS,
supra, note 10, at 197.
170 But see infra text accompanying notes 177-79.
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whether Daily Mail would ever extend beyond the tax context.
71 If
it did not extend beyond the tax context, then it might not bar
existing companies. Such an argument fails for two reasons.
First, not allowing an antecedent home Member State to deny
legal personality would run against Uberseering, which based its
holding on the fact that the German rule would violate the
company's Dutch legal personality.
172
Second, as things stand, companies would have to dissolve and
reincorporate to take advantage of a host Member State's law. This
strategy, as discussed above, is not economically viable. As a
result, existing companies would not change their home
jurisdictions.
They may nevertheless have an incentive to anyhow export
law, perhaps by transferring their seat to take advantage of a more
relaxed tax regime, 173 but this would not lead to a true
jurisdictional competition as these companies could not effectively
choose what state's law they were exporting. Thus, whether or not
a Member State requires dissolution after primary establishment in
emigration, a jurisdictional competition will not ensue for already
existing companies.
In the tax context, however, there is a greater possibility that
existing companies in strict Member States could jurisdictionally
shop. This is because in some cases transferring effective
management, without dissolution, is enough to ensure that a
company is no longer fully under the tax regime of its state of
origin 74 However, Daily Mail would allow the Member State of
origin to impose taxation in this event.175 Such taxation may be
enough to prevent well-established companies from
jurisdictionally shopping for tax law.
If Wymeersch is incorrect, the decisions in Centros, Uberseering,
and Inspire Art suggest a different strategy for Member States
seeking to limit the possibility of jurisdictional competition. Before
considering such a strategy, one most note two points.
171 See Wymeersch, supra note 51, at 645 (expressing a concern that
withdrawing legal personality would undercut the purposes of immigration that
the Court had upheld).
172 See supra Section 2.3.
173 See Neville et al., supra note 169, at 200-12, 224-26 (providing a detailed
discussion why a company could change, at least to some extent, the tax regime to
which it was subject without changing its company law jurisdiction).
174 Id. at 224.
175 See id. (stating that such a view is a basic assumption of Daily Mail).
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
504 JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN THE EC [Vol. 27:2
First, these cases require formation "in accordance with the
legislation of a Member State." 176 Second, a Member State's legal
personality that is first-in-time (the home state) should not be
interfered with except by the Member State under whose law that
company was formed:
[Uberseering's] very existence is inseparable from its status
as a company incorporated under Netherlands law since, as
the Court has observed, a company exists only by virtue of
the national legislation which determines its incorporation
and functioning. The requirement of reincorporation of the
same company in Germany is therefore tantamount to
outright negation of freedom of establishment.177
A strategy in this regard, in the event that tax consequences
were insufficient to control reincorporation, would be for strict
Member States to alter their legislation to incorporate permanence
into the attributes of their national companies so as to prevent
existing companies from terminating their personality.178 Such a
modification would ensure that existing companies duly formed in
strict real seat Member States are always subject to the strict laws.
If this modification happened, strict real seat Member States as
well as state of incorporation Member States could stop companies
from dissolving and reincorporating in more relaxed Member
States. The question is whether they could get away with it, or
whether the ECJ would extend (Iberseering to decide that a primary
establishment in another Member State would offend the legal
personality of the Member State under whose law a company was
formed even when that company wanted to wrap up its affairs?179
If a company is really a creature of national legislation, then why
176 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, para. 101.
177 Case C-208/00, f0berseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, para. 81.
178 See Wymeersch, supra note 95, at 18 (stating that it is not clear "[wjhether
that [Daily Mail] may lead to fully denying companies the right to emigrate, or
merely allows member states to impose certain conditions...."). But cf. Neville et
al., supra note 170, at 224-25 (taking the view that even tax rights would not be
unfettered and would be subject to the proportionality principle).
179 Clearly, the ECJ didn't contemplate this situation, since it stated in Daily
Mail that "all the systems permit the winding-up of a company in one Member
State and its reincorporation in another." Case C-81/87, The Queen v. H.M.
Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General
Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 1-5483, para. 14.
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couldn't a Member State under whose law a company was formed
deny dissolution?
In any event, the following are extremely likely: first, the
freedom of establishment jurisprudence will lead to at least a
possibility of partial jurisdictional competition 180 in the case of new
companies; second, the competition will be averted in the case of
existing companies.181
4. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION-INCENTIVE AND ASSESSMENT
The above discussion has so far mainly gone to the question of
180 Harmonization through Article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty could potentially
prevent a jurisdictional competition. Article 44 (2)(g) provides in pertinent part:
The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving
upon them under the preceding provisions, in particular:
(g) by coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by
Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 48 with a view to making such safeguards
equivalent through the Community.
EC Treaty, art. 42 (2)(g). See also LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 43 (explaining that
harmonization was susceptible to an alternative construction that would not allow
free establishment). For an evaluation of harmonization, see Wymeersch, supra
note 95, at 19 (noting that "harmonization has sometimes been used to achieve
this type of anti-competitive conduct" and that harmonization has a poor record
and would be unlikely to succeed); see also LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at 66 (noting
that harmonization may have disadvantages in terms of regulatory failure,
regulatory capture and innovative ability as well as advantages by achieving
economies of scale). But cf. Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law-A
Comparison of the United States and European Systems and a Proposal for a European
Directive, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 51-61 (2002) (providing a very detailed account of
how specifically harmonization might be achieved); LOMBARDO, supra note 8, at
47-54 (explaining and discussing nine directives and two regulations that have
been successfully adopted with respect to company law harmonization).
181 The jurisdictional competition for reincorporation could change if the
Fourteenth Company Law Directive passes. This would allow "companies to
change their [nationality] without having to be dissolved in the state of origin and
re-incorporated in the receiving state." Neville et al., supra note 170, at 227. It
could also change with the passage of the Tenth Directive on cross-border
mergers. See Birkmose, supra note 10, at 255 (noting that this directive would
make mergers between companies from several different states possible). See
generally EDWARDS, supra note 113, at 391-393 (explaining that the Tenth Directive
has not passed due to a controversial article that allows Member States to not
apply workers' participation rules when an undertaking would result in not
meeting the conditions required for being a representative in an undertaking's
organs).
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the possibility of a jurisdictional competition. However, this does
not address whether Member States would actually have an
incentive to compete, or whether jurisdictional competition in the
case of newly formed companies would be positive. In order to
ascertain the answer to these questions, this Article will take a brief
look at the incentives for jurisdictional competition in the United
States, and whether these incentives have positively affected U.S.
corporate law. Finally, we will consider what implications these
answers have for the EC.
4.1. The U.S. Example
A significant incentive for Delaware to be seriously interested
in attracting incorporations is the franchise fee. "That this can be a
considerable source of revenue may be illustrated by the fact that,
in 1998, franchise tax revenue in Delaware amounted to $400m,
corresponding to more than 19% of Delaware's total tax
receipts."'182
In order to get franchise fees, Delaware has led a race in the
United States that has ended in increasingly relaxed corporate
regulation. "Through countless adaptations of company laws, the
states have tried to make the law so attractive for the companies
that they choose to incorporate in their jurisdictions."
183 These
adaptations have led to the seminal scholarly debate in U.S.
corporate law as to whether Delaware has led corporate law in the
United States in a race to the top or a race to the bottom.84 This
debate hinges on whether the relaxed regulation benefits
182 Birkmose, supra note 10, at 246.
183 Id. at 245.
184 For the origins of the debate, see generally William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974) (noting
jurisdictional competition leads to a race to the bottom); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.L. STUD. 251, 257-60
(1977) (noting jurisdictional competition leads to a race to the top); ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) (describing the market
for corporations and praising the genius of jurisdictional competition); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985) (documenting the importance of the franchise fee in American
jurisdictional competition theory); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469
(1987) (showing the application of interest-group theory on the race to the top or
race to the bottom debate); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:
The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435
(1992) (presenting an empirical analysis of the dynamics and effects of state
competition).
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management at the expense of shareholders, or whether it
optimizes shareholder investments.185
The race to the top argument has become dominant in U.S.
corporate law scholarship. 8 6 Its proponents argue that company
directors will choose to reincorporate in a state whose company
law will maximize values for both shareholders and directors
because their freedom is limited by market forces. 87 As a result,
directors will maximize shareholder earnings in order to keep their
positions.188 The other major disciplining force is the fact that
shareholders can exert a disciplinary effect on directors by
withdrawing their investments.189
4.2. Existing and Newly Formed Companies in the E.C.
Birkmose asserts that the EC will not have any incentive to race
toward laxity for two reasons. First, the same fiscal incentives do
not exist for EC Member States.190 There is no equivalent to the
franchise tax and the potential revenues from company income tax
"will usually be regarded as being resident in the state in which the
company has its seat of management according to the provisions of
a double taxation convention; accordingly, that State generally has
the right to tax the company's income." 19'
185 See Birkmose, supra note 10, at 246-47 ("[T]his disagreement centers on
whether the fact that the individual states periodically adapt their law to the
,needs' of the companies results in legislation enabling companies to optimise
shareholder investments ... or whether the result is legislation that favours
company management....").
186 In Europe, however, race to the top arguments have not historically been
dominant. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Law, in
THE HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAw 3 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed.,
1973) (providing an example of the traditional European view on jurisdictional
competition). See also Stefan Grundman, Regulatory Competition in European
Company Law - Some Different Genius?, in CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF THE
EURO 561 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2002) (noting that many authors in Europe
still regard jurisdictional competition as both unadvisable and not transposable).
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 166 and 195.
187 See Birkmose, supra note 10, at 249 (noting that the most importance of
these disciplining forces is the market for corporate control and the risk of hostile
takeover).
188 See id. at 249 (explaining how the threat of a hostile takeover provides
incentives for directors to act in the best interests of shareholders).
189 See id. at 250 (stating that shareholders might decide to re-invest their
money in a state with more efficient legislation).
190 See id. at 265 (explaining that fiscal factors have been given priority by U.S.
states).
191 Id. at 266. For a detailed discussion of the double taxation convention, see
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This argument assumes that Member States would not race, but
for an immediate fiscal tax incentive. However, it could also be
argued that "countries have sought to improve their chances for
corporate success by implementing the best practices from around
the world. The competition among corporations in product, labor,
and capital markets is thought of as being matched by competition
among corporate governance models." 192 Thus, if racing is the
most efficient system, efficiency itself would seem to create a
sufficient incentive, particularly in a global world.
Second, Birkmose argues that even if the U.S. example of the
race leads to legislation that maximizes shareholder wealth, "the
objective of [EC] company law is not only to regulate the relations
between the company and it shareholders but also between the
company and its other stakeholders." 193  Since maximizing
shareholder wealth is not the only goal of EC Member States, they
will be less likely to race toward laxity even if Member States are
really trying to come up with the most efficient system. Birkmose
thus essentially argues that efficiency is normative, and that U.S.
standards will not transpose onto European standards.
Third, Birkmose suggests that under prevailing European
stakeholder normative standards, a race would not be efficient.
Although shareholders 94 would undoubtedly be protected in a
competition for new incorporations, other stakeholders such as
creditors and employees of a company would potentially not be
protected. 195 In addition, he asserts that the relaxed regulation that
resulted from attracting new incorporations would have a
secondary effect on shareholders of existing companies.
196
This assertion creates two questions: (1) would the secondary
effect on existing companies give rise to investment inefficiency for
Neville et al., supra note 170, at 200-26.
192 Garza, supra note 92, at 82-83 (citations omitted).
193 Birkmose, supra note 10, at 251.
194 See id. at 252 (stating that shareholders would be protected as they would
"know under which conditions the company is to be operated and thus the risks
involved at the time they subscribe for the shares").
195 Id.
196 See id. ("This danger is present because the existing companies in a
Member State are subject to the same law as the new companies, and if the rules
are made more lenient in order to attract new companies, these lenient rules will
also become applicable to the existing companies."). Such an argument actually
understates the potential secondary effect. Newly formed companies in relaxed
states could export their law to strict Member States, while existing companies in
strict Member States would be subject to strict rules.
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shareholders; and (2) even if there is no inefficiency for
shareholders, would there anyhow be stakeholder inefficiency? 97
Newly incorporated companies may have very different
interests from existing companies. In any one Member State, each
company would seem to equally bear the costs of regulation, but
this is not so.
Certain newly formed companies can export law to other
Member States. Existing companies will thus be at a competitive
disadvantage if they are unable to change nationality. If the EC
Member States decide to race -which they would do most likely
out of a belief that it would at least maximize shareholder
investment, as the U.S. example1 98 strongly indicates -it is essential
that the interests of shareholders in newly formed companies do
not diverge too much from those of existing companies. If they
diverge, then there will be no incentive to race.
5. AFTERWARD: THE EFFECT OF THE SE STATUTE
On October 8, 2004, the Statute of the European Corporation or
Societas Europaea ("SE") 199 became effective.200 The SE Statute201
allows companies to be established "in the form of a European
public limited-liability company... ."202 In addition, the SE Statute
is relevant to a number of aforementioned important controversial
issues. Among these issues are codetermination, minimum capital
197 This question is so broad that it is difficult to conclusively address.
However, it does seem to risk losing features such as minimum capital
requirements and codetermination, which relate to the interests of creditors and
employees. For example, if the ECJ rules that codetermination falls within the
scope of "carrying on trades, professions or businesses," the stakeholder efficiency
problem might be somewhat mitigated. See supra text accompanying note 41.
198 See Birkmose, supra note 10, at 246 (suggesting that in the U.S. example
uneven application would not be a concern as companies can freely reincorporate,
without tax implications).
199 See generally CARLA TAVARES DE COSTA & ALEXANDRA DE MEESTER BILREIRO,
THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE (2003) (providing a broad overview of the SE
Statute regime).
200 Friedrich Kubler, The Societas Europaea -Implementation and
Perspectives 1 (2003) (on file with author).
201 See Robert Drury, The European Private Company, in THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPANIES AND COMPANY LAWS, supra note 10, at 57
(noting some basic features of the SE Statute such as limited liability, close
company form, legal personality from the moment of registration, and real seat
theory).
202 Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 3 [hereinafter SE
Statute].
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requirements, and the real seat theory.
The SE Statute deals with codetermination by requiring
companies to "retain or adopt the codetermination regime of the
participating companies which gives the highest degree of
participation to the workers." 2 3  This means that SEs with
establishments in multiple Member States will have to adopt the
laws of strict Member States such as Germany in this regard.
204
The SE Statute deals with minimum capital requirements
primarily through Article 4. Article 4205 requires subscribed capital
in excess of 120,000 Euros and allows a Member State to impose
greater capital requirements on companies carrying on certain
types of activities with registered offices in its Member State. This
figure is substantially in excess of the minimum capital
requirements of typical national companies. 20 6
Articles 7 and 64 of the SE Statute deal with the real seat theory
by reaching "the conclusion that SEs must have their real seat and
seat of incorporation in the same state." 207 These provisions appear
203 Kubler, supra note 200, at 3.
204 See Euro Rules for Companies, BELFAST NEWS LETTER, Dec. 20, 2003, at 22
("The new laws could lead to workers' representatives sitting on boards of major
companies.")
205 SE Statute, supra note 202, arts. 4(2)-(3).
206 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 351 (noting that the Danish minimum capital
requirements that Centros had sought to avoid were only $27,000, or 200,000
Danish Crowns); see also Walter D. Schwidetzky, A Comparison of Corporate
Taxation in the United States and Germany: Different Ways Up the Mountain, 28 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 218 n.7 (2000) (noting that German AG minimum capital
requirements of 5000 are relatively high) citing § 7 AKTrIENGESETZ. An
Aktiengesellschaft ("AG") is a German stock corporation. See generally, William J.
Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV.
855, 866 (1995) (distinguishing the German GmbH, or limited liability company,
from the German AG).
207 The Jurisdiction Competition and the European Company,
http://www.juridix.net/eu-soc/essay4_se.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter Jurisdiction Competition]. Article 7 states: "The registered office of
an SE shall be located within the community, in the same Member State as its
head office." SE Statute, supra note 202, art. 7. Article 64 states:
When an SE no longer complies with the requirement laid down in
Article 7, the Member State in which the SE's registered office is situated
shall take appropriate measures to oblige the SE to regularize its position
within a specified period either:
a) by re-establishing its head office in the Member State in which its
registered office is situated or
b) by transferring the registered office by means of the procedure laid
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to retreat from the national company law cases that had the effect
of nearly abolishing the real seat doctrine.
The result of these provisions is that the new European
Company case law, which potentially lays the path towards a
limited jurisdictional competition, may find itself wholly eroded.
This is because the SE Statute threatens to impose uniformly strict
standards 208 on controversial areas that would mark a retreat from
the position that will likely obtain as a result of Daily Mail, Centros,
Uberseering, and Inspire Art. However, a few different
circumstances would likely prevent this result.
First, the SE Statute in codetermination matters could be
manipulated by an SE setting up a foreign subsidiary in another
Member State and then merging into it. Article 66 of the SE
Statute, in turn, allows companies registered in one state, after a
two year period, to transform itself into a public, limited-liability
company governed by national law.209 Thus, Professor Kubler
notes:
[A] German corporation will be able to merge with a much
smaller foreign company, which may be its subsidiary, into
an SE under British, Dutch or Luxemburg law. But after
two years... the company would no longer be determined
by German law, but by the legal system of its registered
office. 210
Although companies can currently, after the expansive
interpretation of the term "branch", establish their seats in host
Member States, this technique would allow existing companies to
go one step further. They could export relaxed laws by changing a
host Member State into a home Member State without the expense
of setting up a network of subsidiaries.211 This, of course, assumes
down in Article 8.
Id. art. 64.
208 This possibility marks a significant contrast from the popular viewpoints
expressed in the European press. See, e.g., John Plender, Continental Capitalism ai la
Carte, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at 17 (discussing fears that the SE Statute will lead
to a la carte capitalism); Glass is 5% Full- Or 95% Empty, FIN. TIMES Bus. L. EUR.,
Sept. 30, 1997, at 8 (noting that the SE Statute will be an invitation to shop for
accounting, auditing, and tax treatment)
209 See Kubler, supra note 200, at 7 (pointing out a potential loophole in the
statute).
210 Id.
211 See Press Release, European Commission, European Company Statute:
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that such a technique would not incur additional offsetting
expenses.
Whether such a strategy would incur tax consequences is not
yet concrete.212  If the SE merger technique did incur tax
consequences, then SEs would be unable to avoid strict
requirements. In addition, it is highly likely that company
emigration will carry other costs in certain Member States, such as
Germany. These additional potential costs will likely include
appraisal rights, even though such rights are considered to be at
odds with the SE-Regulation.
213
In any case, the SE-Regulation may have only a limited effect
on jurisdictional competition since new companies will likely not
decide to form as SEs at all. Such companies have nothing to be
gained from a potential conversion to another national law at the
expense of more stringent initial requirements, particularly in the
case of minimum capital requirements.
Existing companies, however, will probably become SEs, even
though existing companies registered in non-codetermination
Member States might fear the added costs of subjecting themselves
to a strict codetermination regime by merging with a company in
such a Member State.214  The possibility of merging and
subsequently becoming national companies of another Member
State with less strict law should induce existing companies to form
as SEs, with the exception of Germany and other countries where
the costs would be too severe. The emigration obstacles that
existed under Daily Mail will thus be lifted, and, in the longer run,
such restrictions will ultimately be lifted even in the most obstinate
Commission Welcomes Formal Adoption (Oct. 8, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1376&for
mat=HTML&aged=l&language=en&guiLanguage=en (last visited Apr. 7, 2006)
("The European Company will enable companies to expand and restructure their
cross-border operations without the costly and time-consuming red tape of
having to set up a network of subsidiaries.").
212 See Jurisdiction Competition, supra note 207 (noting that it is uncertain what
the tax consequences of SE mergers will be); HM Treasury, A Competitive and
Modem Business Tax System: Pre-Budget Report 2003 5 (Dec. 10, 2003) (noting that
the SE STATUTE does not mention tax law).
213 Friedrich Kubler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?, 11 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 15. (2005).
214 A merger of this type would dilute shareholder rights regarding control of
the Board. See Plender, supra note 208, at 17 ("But... under the new legal regime
such a merger decision could only be taken by statutory majority and with
specific protections for minority shareholders.").
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Member States, or German corporations will miss out on the
"reorganization of European industries across the traditional
borderlines" and valuable merger opportunities. 215 The result will
inevitably be a full jurisdictional race in the long run, and an
almost complete jurisdictional race in the short run. This will
effectively crush the real seat doctrine and, for better or worse, will
supplant the invisible hand of the indirect efficiency of laxness
with the stakeholder theory and its ostensible virtues.
6. CONCLUSION
The four company law cases considered here have
progressively eroded the ability of strict Member States to prevent
jurisdictional competition. Daily Mail took the first modest step in
this course by declining to announce an anti-circumvention
principle. Instead, it contemplated that freedom of establishment
would conflict with national company law, namely when a
Member State could assert that a company was a creature of its
law. Although effectively anti-circumventionist in the singular
factual situation which it narrowly contemplated, it served as the
basis for holdings that would severely limit a state's ability to
restrict jurisdictional competition.
Daily Mail should therefore not be viewed as a guise to subvert
the freedom of establishment. Instead, Daily Mail was the
beginning of an attempt to carefully reconcile vestiges of
previously existing notions of company national law with Articles
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.
Centros took another step towards permitting jurisdictional
competition. It explicitly stated that circumvention in itself was
not contrary to the freedom of establishment. Instead, it re-
articulated Daily Mail's basic contention that a Member State had
no power over a company, unless that company was a creature of
its law. In so doing, it announced that the ECJ would not stretch
Daily Mail to advance the anti-circumventionist cause. At the same
time, it suggested that Member States might nevertheless be free to
restrict companies that carry on trades, professions, or businesses
without violating the freedom of establishment.
1iberseering was the first and only case that made the EC
directly confront the tension between traditional national company
law and the freedom of establishment. Daily Mail had held that a
215 Kubler, supra note 213, at 17.
20061
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
514 JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN THE EC [Vol. 27:2
Member State having legal personality was sufficient to lift Articles
43 and 48 impediments to restrictions, despite a transfer of the
management office. Uberseering forced the Court to answer
whether real seat Member States could simply assert that a
company became a creature of its national law, even when another
Member State had not ceased to confer legal personality. No
matter what the Court's answer is, some traditional notion of what
it had meant to be a company under national law would have
fallen.
At the end of the day, the Court concluded either (1) that the
real seat's notion of legal personality would yield to the state of
incorporation's notion, or (2) that a second Member State cannot
assert legal personality to the detriment of another State. In any
event, the Court's decision further prevented Member States from
restricting the exportation of national laws.
Inspire Art was a perhaps a final attempt to obtain the power to
prevent jurisdictional competition in company law. Strict Member
States sought to favorably apply the unfavorable after their legal
personality attempt failed in Uberseering. With few avenues left,
strict Member States sought to favorably apply the unfavorable by
basing its minimum capital requirements on Centros. Although
this case had held such requirements contrary to the freedom of
establishment, it asserted a potential exception for restrictions that
dealt with the carrying on of trades, professions, or businesses.
The Court, however, had other plans. The carrying on
exception was not applied, even though the Danish law in question
did not deal with registration requirements. The Court concluded
that it was sufficient that the restrictions were mandatorily applied
and had the effect of creating a heavy burden for companies
seeking to form.
Inspire Art seems to all but close the strict Member States' final
door for obtaining further power to prevent jurisdictional
competition with regard to certain issues. The fate of
codetermination in freedom of establishment jurisprudence will
likely still have to be determined. This is because codetermination
may not sufficiently affect company formation in the same way as
minimum capital requirements do. In addition, codetermination
more properly may have been what the Court contemplated in
Centros when it announced the carrying on exception.
Case analysis of the most recent freedom of establishment
company law cases demonstrates that it is unlikely that Member
States will have power beyond Daily Mail's emigration scenario to
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limit jurisdictional competition. This power, even if no other
measures are possible, will likely prove to be sufficient for
preventing existing companies from jurisdiction shopping because
the tax burden will outweigh any conceivable legal advantage.
Such barriers, however, are not applicable to new company
formation. In new company formation, jurisdictional shopping
will remain a strong possibility.
Jurisdictional shopping does not necessarily imply a race to
laxity. A Member State must have an incentive to develop relaxed
laws, or such a race will not obtain. EC Member States, unlike
Delaware, do not have adequate tax fiscal incentives.
However, the current body of U.S. scholarship suggests that a
race to laxity is naturally, albeit indirectly, efficient. Economic
efficiency in itself might thus be an adequate financial incentive.
This naturally depends on whether EC Member States
progressively come to accept this body of U.S. scholarship. Under
the currently dominant stakeholder theory in the EC, a race would
not be efficient because it would adversely affect the rights of
creditors and workers. In addition, a race might not be efficient in
the EC even under a shareholder theory. This is because
shareholders of existing companies would be at a disadvantage to
take advantage of relaxed rules vis-A-vis shareholders of new
companies.
On October 8, 2004, the SE Statute was enacted, which
governed specifically the formation of EC companies. This statute,
by imposing codetermination and minimum capital requirements
on SE companies, threatened to effectively undo the results of the
ECJ's recent case law, opening the way to a possibility of
jurisdictional competition. However, as Professor Kubler
discovered, a potential exists for SE companies to merge with
subsidiaries and to subsequently become governed by national
company law after a two-year period. This would effectively allow
existing companies to export the law of a new home state without
the expense of setting up subsidiaries. In the short run, certain
Member States, such as Germany, may evade the SE Statute by
imposing costs on dissolution, but such Member States will miss
out on the internationalization and reorganization of European
industry. In the long run, it appears clear that such Member States
will be forced to accept the full implications of the SE Statute and,
to the detriment of stakeholder theory values, full jurisdictional
competition will ensue.
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